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REGULATION OF WATER CARRIERS BY THE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE COMMISSION
LAws designed to regulate transportation have until recently been based on
the unexpressed major premise of a railroad monopoly. But the emergence
of motor carriage and the renaissance of water carriage have compelled legis-
lators to recognize that transportation has to a high degree become a com-
petitive industry. In 1935, to supplement its jurisdiction over railroads and
pipelines, the Interstate Commerce Commission was vested with control over
the rapidly. expanding motor carrier industry.' The Transportation Act of
1940,2 designed to round out the Commission's jurisdiction over the com-
1. 49 STAT. 543 (1935), 49 U. S. C. §§301-27 (Supp. 1938). See Comment (1936)
36 COL. L. REv. 945. The Interstate Commerce Act, 24 STAT. 379 (1887), 49 U. S. C.
§§ 1-27 (1934), established the Interstate Commerce Commission and gave it power to
regulate railroads and those common water carriers entering into through routes with
railroads. The Hepburn Act, 34 STAT. 584 (1906), 49 U. S. C. § 1(3) (1934) vested the
Commission with control over oil pipe lines.
2. Pub. L. No. 785, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (Sept. 18, 1940). The Act is an omnibus
bill amending various sections of Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act which pertains
to railroad regulation, and of Part II which provides for regulation of motor carriers.
It adds a new Part III dealing with water carriers, the part with which this Comment
is chiefly concerned. The Interstate Commerce Commission has announced that the ad-
ministrative work under Part III will for the most part be handled by its existing bu-
reaus; a separate Bureau of Water Carriers will, however, have charge of the determina-
tion of exemptions and the issuance of certificates and permits. C. C. H. Federal Carriers
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peting units in a revolutionized industry, invests the ICC with almost complete
power over transportation by water.
Though water carriers for many years have had to comply with govern-
mental standards in navigation, equipment, and safety of operations,3 there
has been only piecemeal control over their relations with the shipping public.
Beginning in 1916,4 legislation empowered the United States Shipping Board
to regulate intercoastal, coastwise and Great Lakes' common carriers by
suspending unreasonable or discriminatory charges and substituting maximum
rates therefor, and by approval of conference agreements designed to prevent
disastrous rate wars. Repeated failures of these latter attempts at self-regu-
lation 5 led Congress in 1938 to vest minimum rate power over both inter-
coastal and coastwise common carriers in the Board's successor, the Maritime
Commission,0 but not over common carriage on the Great Lakes. The Inter-
state Commerce Commission also had a measure of control over the com-
petitive relations of water carriers; it could require the establishment of
through routes and joint rates with the railroads,7 and it regulated water
carriers owned or controlled by competing railroads.8 In addition, sporadic
efforts at regulation were made by several of the states.0 But this patchwork
regulation left contract carriers operating coastwise, on the Great Lakes and
on inland waters, common carriers on inland waters, and private carriers in
general relatively free from restraints. 10
Service, 1 14,101 (1940). The major sections of the Act are to take effect on March 1,
1941. C. C. H. Federal Carriers Service, f 14,107 (1940).
It is to be noted that the airlines still remain outside the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission. See 84 CONG. REa 6147 (1939).
3. Since 1784 various Congressional Acts have established these standards. For a
collection of the Acts see 46 U. S. C. §§ 1-800 (1934) and 33 U. S. C. §§ 1-950 (1934).
4. The Shipping Act of 1916, 39 STAT. 728 (1916), 46 U. S. C. §§801-842 (1934),
as amended by the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 41 STAT. 988 (1920), 46 U. S. C.
§§861-889 (1934), and the Intercoastal Shipping Act of 1933, 47 STAT. 1425 (1933),
46 U. S. C. §§ 844-848 (1934).
5. See Bettman, The Ulited States Intercoaslal Shipping Conference (1933) 12
HAv. Bus. R-v. 116. The conferences failed both because of internal dissension and
external forces such as the competition of industrial and foreign carriers.
6. 52 STAT. 964 (1938), 46 U. S. C. §§ 845a-845b (Supp. 1938), amending the Inter-
coastal Shipping Act of 1933, 47 STAT. 1425 (1933), 46 U. S. C. §§ 844-848 (1934) which
had given the Shipping Board power to suspend specific rates but not to set minimum
rates for intercoastal common carriers (defined to include contract carriers). See Loct-
LIx, EcoNosucs OF TRANSpORTATioN (1938) 727. The Merchant Marine Act of 1935,
49 STAT. 1987 (1936), 46 U. S. C. § 1114(a) (Supp. 1938), had transferred all the Board's
powers to the Maritime Commission.
7. See note 1 supra.
8. Panama Canal Act of 1912, 37 STAT. 566 (1912), 49 U. S. C. §5(19)-(21)
(1934).
9. Thirty-two states and the District of Columbia have laws regulating in various
degrees water carrier rates and practices in intrastate commerce. See Eastman, Regula-
tion of Transportation Agencies, SEN. Doc. No. 152, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 158.
10. The geographical expanse of the industry covers various combinations of inter-
coastal, coastwise, Great Lakes, river, and canal carriage. Within each system, more-
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Uninhibited by federal regulation, the business of water transportation
expanded enormously in the post-war period." Vast public expenditures for
waterway improvements 1 2 enabled the water carrier industry to get a sub-
stantial foothold in the transportation market. But it was not until the depres-
sion that railroad management and labor realized the existence of a formidable
rival in the water carrier, and called for its regulation. 3 In a transportation
system which had undergone a metamorphosis from one monopoly to a scheme
of competition, the railroads could logically argue that either they should be
unleashed to meet their new competitors on even terms or else that these
competitors should be made to conform to a common set of rules.14 The rail-
roads, moreover, were not alone in their complaint; the Commission had
found difficulty in reconciling the interests of a regulated railroad industry
with those of an unregulated and subsidized' 5 water carrier industry, and had
repeatedly suggested uniform federal regulation.' 0 Moreover, several of the
over, the carriage is generally classified as common, contract, and private: the common
carrier holding itself out to serve the public for reasonable compensation; the contract
carrier picking and choosing its customers on its own terms; the private carrier trans-
porting the goods of its owner. Nevertheless, because of the peculiar nature of the in-
dustry, it is not unusual for one carrier to assume the functions of any two or three of
these types of carriage. See Eastman, supra note 9, at 6, 7.
11. Water traffic has increased tremendously since 1920. For example, intercoastal
trade via the Panama Canal grew from 1,372,000 long tons in 1921 to 10,490,000 long
tons in 1930; coastwise domestic trade increased from 47,260,000 net tons in 1920 to
117,821,000 net tons in 1930 and Ohio river traffic from 9,302,000 net tons to 22,337,000
net tons. See 45TrH ANN. REP. ICC (1931) 98-99.
12. Of the unadjusted total of three billion dollars (including amounts attributable to
non-navigable purposes such as flood control) which the Federal Government has ex-
pended on river and harbor improvements within the United States as of June 30, 1936,
77% has been made available since 1910, 64% since 1920, and 33% since 1932. The Mis-
sissippi river system has received about one-half of this total. See 3 PuBLic AIDs 'To
TRANSPORrATioN (Fed. Coord. of Transp. 1939) 11, 12. These expenditures were made
partly to compensate for recurring railroad car shortages, partly to meet a public demand
for a cheaper form of transportation, and partly to effectuate a policy of forcing rail
rates down through the encouragement of water competition. Id. at 11.
13. The railroads were late in recognizing water and motor carriers as serious rivals
in the transportation market. Shrinkage in the volume of railroad traffic attributable to
the low level of business activity during the depression years, however, precipitated a
"railroad problem," whose solution railroad leaders sought in the regulation of compet-
ing modes of transportation. See Hearings before Committee oft Interstate and Foreign
Comnerce of H. R. 2531, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 1702-1705.
14. See Eastman, Fourth Report of the Federal Coirdinator on Transportation Leg-
islation, H. R. Doc. No. 394, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 14.
15. The water carrier has a decided cost advantage over other forms of transporta-
tion because it does not need to contribute to the upkeep of its highway. For discussion,
see p. 667 infra.
16. As early as 1888 the Commission had recommended complete water carrier regu-
lation. See 53D ANN. REP. ICC (1939) 25. After the Federal Co6rdinator had recom-
mended such regulation in 1934 (EASTMAN, supra note 9, at 11), the Commission re-
iterated the demand in its annual reports through 1939. Without comprehensive author-
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water carriers themselves had sought regulation as a possible solution for the
discriminatory practices and recurrent rate wars within the industry.17 Rebates
to large shippers by contract and private carriers not only prejudiced small
shippers but also made precarious the position of the common carrier;18 rate-
cutting and over-tonnaging in the trade exhausted the financial resources of
many carriers, made it impossible to enlist the support of private capital to
replace over-aged ships, and left most of the industry in a depressed state.20
The present Act seeks to meet these diverse needs by granting broad powers
to the Interstate Commerce Commission, enabling it to regulate the relations
of the carriers both among themselves and with the shipping public. In the
nature of a preamble to the whole body of interstate commerce law the Act
proclaims a "National Transportation Policy" by which the Commission is
expected to regulate fairly and impartially all forms of transportation subject
to its jurisdiction so as to preserve the inherent advantages of each, to pro-
mote an adequate, economical and efficient service, and to prevent unfair and
destructive competitive practices. It is the purpose of this Comment to
analyze the provisions of the Act dealing with water carriage against the
background-of the problems of the industry, and to indicate how the Com-
mission may be expected best to effectuate this sweeping Congressional
mandate.
Limits of Regulation. Although it is axiomatic that the common carrier
upon whom the public depends for regular service must be held to a high
degree of responsibility,20 in the water transportation industry it is the com-
mon carrier which has suffered most from the destructive competitive prac-
tices of its fellow contract and private carriers.21 It is not surprising, there-
fore, to discover that the provisions of the Act manifest a clear intent on the
part of Congress to establish a responsible and economically secure common
carrier service.
A common carrier engaged in interstate commerce2 is defined as "any
person which holds itself out to the general public to engage in transporta-
ity over water carriers, it has been extremely difficult for the Commission to decide
cases involving competing rail and water lines. See Eastman, supra note 14, at 12-13;
Sugar Cases of 1933, 195 I. C. C. 127, 131 (1933).
17. See Eastman, mpra note 9, at 169. In general, the contract and private carriers
have been opposed to federal regulation.
18. See Eastman, supra note 9, at 11.
19. See Eastman, stpra note 9, at 11, 102. It must be noted that not all sections
of the industry suffer from each of the competitive malpractices described above. The
Act, however, treats the whole industry as a unit.
20. See note 23 infra.
21. See Eastman, supra note 14, at 14.
22. Section 302(i) defines "transportation in interstate or foreign commerce" as
transportation of persons or property from one state to another or from a foreign coun-
try to the United States insofar as such movement takes place within the United States.
§303(j) expressly excludes. intrastate transportation from the operation of the Act;
§ 303 (k) makes the so-called Shreveport doctrine (Houston, E. & NV. T. Ry. v. United
1941]
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tion by water . . .for compensation."' 23 Administration of a similar defini-
tion in the Motor Carrier Act 24 indicates that the Commission will have much
leeway in classifying common carriers. Thus, it will probably not exclude
an applicant from the common carrier category because he accepts only spe-
cified types of commodities, 2 5 because common carriage is not his full-time
occupation and he hauls only when his duties in connection with his other
business permit,26 because he does his business by contract,27 or even because
he purchases the commodity from the shipper with his own funds and delivers
it to the customer at a price in excess of the cost to him. 28 This expanded
definition seems especially desirable in view of the need for abundant services
capable of satisfying varying public requirements.
Because of the broad definition of the common carrier, the term "contract
carrier" is closely restricted to those agencies which do not hold themselves
out to the general public but which, on the contrary, ship "under individual
contracts and agreements." 29 Furthermore, since the Act exempts from regu-
lation all those contract carriers whose operations are not in competition with
common carrier service,3 0 it would seem that the class of contract carriers
which actually will be regulated may be surprisingly small, namely, those
contract carriers whose competitive practices - if left unregulated - might
jeopardize common carrier service.
Unlike the Motor Carrier Act, the present Act fails to define the term
"private carrier."'3 1 In fact, although the original draft of the Act provided
for the registration and limited regulation of private carriers so as to prevent
their encroachment upon the business of common or contract carriers,82 the
Act in its final form requires the Commission to grant these carriers revocable
States, 234 U. S. 342 (1914), whereby the Commission may change any intrastate rail-
road rate which discriminates against interstate commerce) inapplicable to water car-
rier regulation. In administering the Motor Carrier Act, however, the Commission has
claimed jurisdiction over intrastate movements which are interstate in character. See
Rush Common Carrier Application, 17 M. C. C. 661 (1939).
23. §302(d). This is essentially the common law definition of a common carrier.
See Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 21 How. 7, 22 (U. S. 1858). Section 305(a) indicates
that the carrier may restrict his "holding out" to specific commodities or classes of com-
modities; it is only these services which the carrier is under a common law and statu-
tory duty to furnish upon reasonable request.
24. Motor Carrier Act, § 203(a) (14)..
25. See Slagle Contract Carrier Application, 2 M. C. C. 127 (1937).
26. See Patman Contract Carrier Application, 2 M. C. C. 194 (1937).
27. See Beatty Contract Carrier Application, 1 M. C. C. 141 (1936).
28. See Carpenter Common Carrier Application, 2 M. C. C. 85 (1937).
29. § 302(e).
30. Section 303(e) exempts: "transportation by contract carrier by water which,
by reason of the inherent nature of the commodities transported, their requirement of
special equipment, or their shipment in bulk, is not actually and substantially competitive
with transportation by any common carrier subject to this part or part I or part II."
31. In the Motor Carrier Act "private carrier" is defined in § 203 (a) (17).
32. Eastman, supra note 9, at 44.
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certificates of exemption.3 3 This special treatment of the private carrier
can be explained either on the assumption that Congress did not believe their
regulation was requisite to an adequate common carrier service1 or that it
believed that regulation of the private carrier would be unconstitutional.
35
As the Commission in dealing with the whole transportation system is to
be concerned only with those water carriers which substantially compete with
railroads and motor carriers, the Act excepts all carriers which are dearly
non-competitive. Hence, transportation by contract or common carriers of
liquid cargoes in bulk in tank vessels,30 transportation by common or contract
carrier of not more than three unwrapped bulk commodities,3 7 and transporta-
tion by contract carriers on the Great Lakes of the same number of bulk
commodities 38 - all are absolutely exempted from the provisions of the Act.
These exemptions are based on the assumption that the cost of shipping com-
modities such as petroleum, iron ore, limestone, and grain is so much cheaper
by water than by rail or motor that no competitive questions could possibly
arise.39 Nevertheless, unless the Commission is circumspect, these presum-
ably justifiable exemptions may be subjected to abuse by ingenious carriers.4 0
In addition to these functional exemptions there are several discretionary
exemptions of a miscellaneous nature. The Commission may except from
any part of the Act common or contract carriers which, if regulated, would
be obliged to compete at a disadvantage with foreign water carriers -a pro-
vision primarily directed at the Canadian freighters on the Great Lakes. 41
Again, the Commission is empowered to exclude from the operation of the
Act transportation within the limits of a single harbor, transportation by
33. §303(h).
34. This was not discussed in the Congressional debates on the Act.
35. Senator Wheeler ex-pressed this opinion in the Senate debate on the Act. 84
CoNG. REc. 5871 (1939). See Frost Trucldng Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U. S. 583,
592 (1926) and Michigan Comnm'n v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570, 577 (1925) for the proposi-
tion that a private carrier cannot be converted into a common carrier by mere legisla-
tive fiat.
36. § 303(d).
37. §303(b). But the subsection is specifically made inapplicable to bulk freight
shipments subject to the Intercoastal Shipping Act of 1933.
38. §303(c). Whereas the bulk commodities named in §303(b) must be of a hind
"delivered by the carrier without transportation mark or count" and "without wrappers
of containers,' these specifications are not added to § 303(c).
39. See Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Comrnercc, on H. R.
2531, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 1675. But in some sections railroads do compete with
shipments of petroleum by water. See Gasoline & Kerosene to River Ports in Alabama,
229 I. C. C. 509 (1938); Petroleum between California, Oregon, & Nevada, 219 I. C. C.
789 (1937).
40. See Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of H. R.
2531, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 1134-1135.
41. § 304(d). See 84 CONG. REc. 5885-6 (1939).
42. § 303(g) (1).
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small craft, by vessels carrying not more than sixteen passengers, and by
ferries, and the operation of contractor's equipment and salvors.
43
Control of the Quantity of Competitive Services. For years one of the
major weaknesses in the water transportation industry has been the over-
tonnaging of parts of the trade. In the intercoastal trade, for example,
the sale of government-built freighters after the war impaired the economic
condition of the industry.44 Moreover, the Shipping Board had no power
to control the number of carriers engaging in these trades, and the Board
had refused to permit the carriers to incorporate in their conference agree-
ments restrictions against the admission of newcomers to the trades.45 The
carriers therefore had no choice but to try to hold their business by under-
cutting new competitors. In vesting the Interstate Commerce Commission
with power to handle the problem of overtonnaging, Congress has sought not
only to promote the economic well-being of existent carriers in the industry,
but also, by curtailing the operation of private and contract carriers, to protect
common carriers from discriminatory practices at their hands.
Section 309(a) makes it illegal for a common carrier to engage in water
transportation unless it first obtains a certificate of public convenience and
necessity from the Commission. A "grandfather clause" 40 enables a carrier
which has been in bona fide operation since January 1, 1940, to obtain a
certificate without proof of its eligibility to perform a public service or of
its indispensability to the shipping public. But to meet the eligibility require-
ment,47 a new common carrier applicant will have to demonstrate both an
adequacy of facilities and a willingness to perform its common law duty of
meeting all reasonable requests for service at reasonable rates; to show indis-
pensability4" he will probably have the burden of proving that present rail,
motor and water service falls short of the public needs which are to be satis-
fied by his proposed services. 49 Even if the applicant measures up to these
standards, he is not assured a certificate carte blanche, for it is within the
province of the Commission to specify his routes and, with certain enumer-
ated exceptions, to place upon his operations other "reasonable" limitations."0
Instead of proving "public convenience and necessity," the contract carrier
applying for a permit must demonstrate that his proposed operations will
be "consistent with the public interest and the national transportation policy"
43. § 303 (g) (2).
44. See 84 CONG. REc. 6147 (1939).





49. This is the standard which has been used in the administration of the Motor
Carrier Act. See Norton Common Carrier Application, 1 M. C. C. 114 (1936). But see
Bowles Common Carrier Application, 1 M. C. C. 589 (1937).
50. § 309(d).
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of the Act 5 '-a standard construed in the administration of the Mutor
Carrier Act as confining the contract carrier's function to those specialized
services required by the peculiar needs of the shipping public wlich common
carriage is unable to meet 5  Presumably, in view of the "National Trans-
portation Policy," the "inherent advantages" of contract carriage - the ability
to handle large shipments at unscheduled times -will be given due consider-
ation. Again, as in the case of the common carrier, the Commission can with
certain exceptions determine the scope of the business of the contract carrier,
and delimit its operations so as to make the position of the common carrier
impregnable.m
To prevent discrimination against shippers of similar commodities between
the same points and also to forestall the evasion of applicable tariffs, the Act
forbids a carrier to hold simultaneously both a certificate as a common carrier
and a permit as a contract carrierr4 This ban on "dual operations" has been
vigorously protested by leaders in the industry as contrary to the established
custom of a common carrier to fill its excess capacity with contract orders,
and of contract carriers to perform occasional common carrier services.?
Recognition of this custom led the Conference Committee to add a clause
empowering the Commission to relieve carriers from the operation of this
prohibition if "the public interest and the national transportation policy" will
not suffer5 0 Practice under the Motor Carrier Act, which contains a similar
"escape" clause, 7 indicates that the Commission will be likely to permit dual
operations only where the two operations appear not to be substantially com-
petitive, i.e., where they do not reach the same class of shippers,58 serve the
same points, 9 or involve the same type of goods.60
The Act as first drafted would have prohibited a private carrier from
conducting common or contract operations.0 ' This provision, however, was
eliminated in Committee - leaving the Commission discretion to treat the
problem in the light of the "National Transportation Policy." In the Geraci
51. §309(g).
52. See the concurring opinion of Chairman Eastman in Keystone Transp. Co. Con-
tract Carrier Application, 19 M. C. C. 475, 496 (1939).
53. § 309(g).
54. § 310.
55. It was the contention of the w\ater carriers that this ban on "dual operations"
would destroy the paramount advantage of water transportation to shippers: the flexi-
bility and variety of services it can offer. See Hearings before Coninilice on Intcrstate
and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 2531, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 1128, 1338; East-
man, supra note 9, at 7, 12.
56. § 310.
57. Motor Carrier Act, § 210.
58. See Nelson Extensions of Operations, 1 M. C. C. 285 (1936).
59. See Wade Common Carrier Application, I Federal Carriers Cases 7469 (1940).
60. See Transcontinental Contract Carriers Contract Carrier Application, 18 M. C.
C. 261 (1939).
61. Eastman, vspra note 9, at 44.
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case6 2 arising under the Motor Carrier Act the Commission felt compelled
by some of the language now incorporated in this "policy" to prohibit abso-
lutely for-hire operations by a private carrier. It based its decision on the
ground that such a mixture of operations would give the private carrier an
undue advantage over common and contract carriage. While the advantage
the private carrier enjoys because it can operate on a low overhead made
possible by an assured" traffic obtained without solicitation expense is counter-
balanced by the disadvantage that it suffers through its inability to fill its
return load, it was reasoned in the Geraci case that the private carrier could
overcome this disadvantage by operating as a for-hire carrier on its return
trip; and that the ability of private carriage thus to compete on better than
even terms with regular for-hire carriage would undoubtedly invite traffic
diversion from both common and contract carriage. Such a result, the Com-
mission felt, would be contrary to the spirit of the Congressional policy of
promoting "adequate, economical and efficient service" and of fostering "sound
economic conditions in transportation" among the several carriers. Yet, since
such a mixture of operations has for long been the accepted custom in sections
of the water transportation industry,63 it is evident that an invocation of the
Geraci rule by the Commission will demonstrate its clear purpose to weight
the scales in favor of for-hire carriage.
Power Over Rates. While a surplus of competitive facilities is one cause
of the depressed state of sections of the water transportation industry,
destructive trade practices have unquestionably been the chief source of
trouble. Efforts at price stabilization in the intercoastal trade by means of
conference agreements have failed because carriers within and without the
conference have resorted to secret rebating and other forms of discrimination,
inevitably culminating in open rate wars.6 4 One result of these competitive
struggles has been a weakening of the position of the common carrier upon
whom the public must depend; in fact, the vicious rate-slashing policies of
private and contract carriers have all but driven the common carrier from
parts of the industry.6 5 Moreover, the resulting instability of rates has been
inimical to the interests of shippers who have been unable to ascertain what
their competitors were paying for their transportation services, since all rates
were not published. 66
62. Geraci Contract Carrier Application, 7 M. C. C. 369 (1938).
63. See note 55 supra.
64. See note 5 supra.
65. See Eastman, supra note 14, at 14. The common carrier is overshadowed by the
contract and private carriers in many parts of the trade. In 1932 common carriage ac-
counted for 31% of the traffic on the Mississippi river, but only 3.6% oil the Ohio river
and less than 5% on the Great Lakes. In the intercoastal trade, however, 90% of the
traffic, other than tanker traffic, is handled by common carriers. Eastman, supra note
9, at 7-8.
66. See Eastman, supra note 9, at 11.
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In order to protect the shipping public, the Act gives the Commission
plenary rate powers over common carriage. Every common carrier must
file with the Commission and print for public inspection the exact charges
for all items, and must rigidly adhere to these charges. 7 The Commission
may suspend these rates when it sees fit, and prescribe the exact rates, or
the maximum or minimum, whenever it finds the prevailing rates either un-
reasonable or discriminatory to shippers. 8 By requiring the common carrier
to give the public thirty days' notice prior to a rate change, the Commission
also is able to prevent unexpected fluctuations in charges.0 9 While rebates
and discriminations among shippers are outlawed,70 only those shippers de-
pendent on such carrier services as had previously been regulated may claim
reparations, and the same procedural methods are available as to shippers
by rail.71 Carriers may not prejudice shippers at intermediate points on a
route by charging less for the whole haul than for any part thereof. 2 Finally,
for the numerous shippers who require through rail and water service, the
Act strengthens the Commission's control over through routes and joint rates
by adding to its present powers minimum rate power over the water carrier's
division of the charge.73
Though such an array of controls seems quite adequate to protect the
shipper's interest, their ultimate effectiveness depends primarily on the econ-
omic stability of the common carrier. To insure the economic health of
common carriage, the Act enables the Commission to regulate to a limited
degree the rate-making policies of regulated contract carriers. Every contract
carrier must establish and observe reasonable minimum charges ;74 the Com-
mission may require the contract carrier to file copies of its actual contracts,
which the Commission may make public in the event the carrier violates the
schedule of minimum rates on file with the Commission. 7 The Commission
has power to alter these minimum charges in the light of the "National Trans-
portation Policy," but the rates so prescribed must not give the contract
carrier any undue advantage over competing common carriers.70 These pro-
67. §306(a) and (c).
68. §307(b) and (g).
69. § 306(d).
70. §306(c).
71. § 308. Evidently Congress felt that to put liability for reparations on the newly
regulated water carriers would be inadvisable. The Motor Carrier Act makes no pro-
vision for reparations.. See MAcLEAY, REGULATIOi OF WNIATER C mumis (1940) 24.
72. This is the long-and-short haul clause, § 4 of the Interstate Commerce Act, which
the present Act amends to embrace water carriers by § 6 of Title I.
73. § 307 (d). Previously the Commission had power only to fix maximum rates for
the water carrier's division of the charge. See 49TH ANN.-. REP. ICC (1935) 34, where
the Commission recommended that it be granted this minimum rate power to effect sta-
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visions appear to evidence a clear Congressional intent to prevent contract
carriers from demoralizing common carrier service by the device of drastic
rate reductions.
In addition to fortifying the position of the common carrier, the minimum
rate power serves as the Commission's main instrument for adjusting the
conflicting interests among the several forms of transportation. That the Com-
mission, at the instigation of the railroads, might employ these powers to
equate water rates with rail rates was a fear frequently voiced while the Act
was being debated.7 7 To obviate this possibility, the water carriers persuaded
the legislators to write into the Act several specific safeguards. One is the
clause in the "National Transportation Policy" which instructs the Com-
mission to regulate all modes of transportation so as to "recognize and pre-
serve the inherent advantages of each." Thus, in a case where the railroads
want to reduce their rates to the level of the water carrier rates, although
the rail transportation is clearly more costly than water carriage, presumably
the Commission should deny the proposed reduction. 78 A second safeguard
is found in the water carrier rate-making rule, which requires the Com-
mission to consider inter alia "the effect of rates upon the movement of traffic
by the carrier or carriers for which the rates are prescribed." 70 That is,
the Commission must not set a minimum rate so high that the for-hire water
carrier will lose its business either to the railroads or to private water carriers,
always a potential substitute form of carriage within the industry. This
restraint is considerably reinforced by the last sentence of the rate-making
rule which recognizes the water carriers' need of sufficient revenues to pro-
vide an adequate and efficient service.80 As a final protection, the water
carrier interests had a proviso inserted into the "no discrimination" subsection
stating that differences in rates of a water carrier from those of a rail carrier
should not be deemed to constitute discrimination within the meaning of the
Act."1
Although the Act lays down these broad policy considerations as a guide,
the Commission must itself establish the economic formulae for the determina-
tion of minimum rates. If previous regulation of water carrier rates by the
Commission and other governmental agenies is any criterion, such formulae
are more likely to be common-sensical than scientific. For instance, the rule
of thumb the Commission has used to set joint water-rail rates in competition
77. See 84 GONG. Rzc. 6136 (1939).
78. Of course this statement is based on the assumption that both the competing
water and rail carriers are operating on a full-cost basis. If the water carrier is oper-
ating below full-cost it may be necessary to permit the rail carrier to reduce its rate
correspondingly. For a discussion of the several schools of thought on the question, see
53D ANN. REP. ICC (1939) 27-28.
79. § 307(f). See the statement of Senator Wheeler in 84 CONG. Rc. 5873 (1939).
80. §307(f).
81. § 305(c). See 86 CoxG. REc., Sept. 6, 1940, at 17618.
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with all-rail rates is a twenty per cent differential, subject to diminution to
as little as ten per cent depending upon the circuity of the water-rail route.8
But the Commission has not pretended to assert the scientific accuracy of
this differential. 83 If the Commission desired to fix a minimum rate on a
cost basis in a rate controversy, however, it probably would choose as a
minimum a slight margin over "out-of-pocket costs" - the basis it has ap-
proved in railroad rate-making.84 In administering the Motor Carrier Act,
the greater potential dangers of this "out-of-pocket costs" theory for motor
carriers than for railroads by reason of the greater number of operators in-
volved has been recognized.8 5 This condition also applies to the water trans-
portation industry; fairness, however, would seem to require the Commission,
should it continue to allow the railroads to apply this theory, to give the
water carriers equal leeway. Ideally, "full costs" would be the most desirable
minimum rate formula, since it would benefit the public by promoting that
mode of transportation which could operate at the lowest unit cost; practical
considerations, however, such as the difficulty of ascertaining costs and the
inadvisability of abandoning existing facilities, stand in the way of realizing
this ideal in the near future. 
8
Because maximum rate-making has a much older tradition behind it than
minimum rate making, 7 the Commission will have a plethora of theories upon
which to draw in establishing maximum rates for common carriage. A stip-
ulation in the Act which prohibits the Commission from considering good
will, earning power or the worth of the operating certificate in evaluating
the carrier's property,88 implies that Congress anticipated the use of the
Smyth v. Ames rule,89 of a fair return based on valuation, in the establish-
ment of maximum rates. Failure to find a successful method of evaluating
rail property may, however, militate against any similar attempt in water
carrier regulation.90 It seems more probable that the Commission will lean
82. See Locs.rg, Ecoixomcs or TRANPonI.Tior (1938) 740.
83. This differential of 20% in favor of the water carrier is not based on cost of
service but on a belief that such a differential is necessary in order to attract any traffic
to the barge lines. See LocKuiN, op. cit. supra note 82, at 740. Similarly, the blanket
minimum rate order the Maritime Commission set in the 1940 Intercoastal Rate Struc-
ture Investigation was not based on anything more objective than the generally demoral-
ized state of the industry. 2 U. S. M. C. 285 (1940).
84. See 53D Axnx. RP. ICC (1939) 26.
85. See Refrigerator Material from Memphis to Dayton, 4 M. C. C. 187, 189 (1933).
86. Chairman Eastman testified that "full costs" w%,as the ideal standard toward which
the Commission should strive. Hearings before Committee on Interstate & Foreign
Commerce on H. R. 2531, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 1710-1711.
87. The Commission did not receive control over minimum rates until the enactment
of the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 ST.T. 485 (19-20), 49 U. S. C. § 15(1) (1934).
88. §307(c). The same subsection is included in the 'Motor Carrier Act in §216(h).
See Comment (1936) 36 COL. L. REv. 945, 962.
89. 169 U. S. 466 (1898).
90. See HEALY, THE EcoNo ics OF TExNSPor To-r (1940) 541.
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upon the more convenient tests of how valuable the service is to the shipper, 1
how the proposed rate compares with prevailing water rates on comparable
commodities, 2 and - a special consideration in water carrier regulation -
how much space is available aboard the carrier for shipping the commodity
in question. 93 Furthermore, consideration, on the one hand, of whether the
proposed rate will enable the shipper to reach his market 4 and, on the other
hand, of whether the rate is justified in view of increases in costs of labor,
fuel and other items, will also carry weight in the final determination." All
these criteria have been so thoroughly intermixed in rate-making cases, that
it is impossible to guess which will take precedence in the establishment of
maximum rate structures for common carriage by water.
Auxiliary Powers. In order to implement its powers, the Commission is
authorized to regulate the financial practices of water carriers subject to the
Act. It can investigate the problems of common management and control
and recommend remedial legislation to Congress. 0 It has full authority over
consolidations, mergers, acquisitions, and pooling agreements entered into
by water carriers. 7 In fact, the Act endows the Commission with all the
financial powers it has over railroads except control over the issuance of
securities.
8
A second set of ancillary powers granted to the Commission relates to
accounting practices which have seldom been regularized in the water carrier
industry.99 Under the Act the Commission can require annual, periodical
and special reports, 0 0 prescribe a uniform system of accounts, 10 1 prescribe
forms for all records and memoranda and the length of time they must be
preserved, 0 2 classify property for depreciation purposes and establish depre-
ciation rates.'03
91. This is one of the tests the Shipping Board and its successors have employed.
See Eastbound Intercoastal Lumber, 1 U. S. M. C. 608 (1936). See Edgerton, Value of
the Service as a Factor in Rate Making (1919) 32 HARV. L. REV. 516.
92. See Eastbound Intercoastal Lumber, 1 U. S. M. C. 608 (1936).
93. See Heller v. Eastern Steamship Lines, Inc., 1 U. S. S. B. 158 (1929).
94. See Eastbound Intercoastal Lumber, 1 U. S. M. C. 608 (1936). See LocrimN,
ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION (1938) 731.
95. See Commodity Rates between Atlantic & Gulf Ports, I U. S. M. C. 642 (1937).
96. § 304(b).
97. § 7 of Title I of the Act, amending § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act.
98. See p. 668 infra.
99. The accounts used by those carriers which entered into joint rail-and-water rates
were prescribed by the Commission. Interstate Commerce Act, 24 STAT. 386 (1887), 49
U. S. C. § 20(1) (1934).
100. § 313(a).
101. § 313(c).
102. §313(e) and (g).
103. § 313(d).
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The Act also contains the usual penal and enforcement powers. 1°4 Fines
as high as $5,000 are provided for willful violations of the mandatory sections
of the Act, and the Commission is entrusted with all the necessary instruments
of administration. It has power to designate agents for the service of notices
and orders, and to suspend, modify or set aside its own orders' 0 5
Conclusions. Early drafts of the Act recommended abandoning the policy
of government subsidization of water transportation; they provided for the
assessment of tolls to cover the costs of inland waterway improvements ' and
for the sale of the government-owned barge lines operating on the Mississippi
and Warrior rivers.'07 Moreover one of the duties of the new Board of In-
vestigation' 0 s for which the Act provides is to recommend legislation on the
question of subsidization. It is thus possible that water carriers may eventually
be made to operate on a full cost basis. However, since each transportation
industry has received government aid early in its history, it seems fair to
adjust any system of tolls to cover only future and not past improvement
and maintenance costs.' 0 9 These costs in turn should be adjusted to exclude
charges attributable to flood-control and other non-navigation purposes." 0
Though outright sale of the federal barge lines may be neither practical nor
desirable,"' they should not be permitted to continue operation at a deficit." 2
If public subsidization of railroads and motor carriers is treated in like man-
ner, the abandonment of water carrier subsidies might tend to put inter-
carrier competition on a more equitable cost basis.
104. §317.
105. §315.
106. Title III of H. R. 2531, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
107. See H. . RFw. No. 1985, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933) (Shannon Committee's re-
port recommending discontinuance of the lines. See Hearings before Committee on In-
terstate and Foreign Commerce on H. P. 2531, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 1527).
108. Section 301 of Title III of the Act establishes a board of investigation, composed
of three members appointed by the President, to investigate the whole transportation
problem.
109. The railroads were heavily subsidized by public grants of land during the nine-
teenth century. See I PUBLIC AIDs ro TRANSPORTATION, (Fed. Coord. of Transp. 1940)
12-13.
110. Id. at 55.
111. The Federal Barge Lines were built during the World War to meet the
shortage of transportation facilities. Reorganized as the Inland Waterways Corporation
in 1924, they were meant to continue under government operation until an adequate pri-
vate common carrier service was established on the Mississippi and Warrior rivers. Even
assuming that such a service has been established, it is doubtful whether private interests
would be willing to take over the lines except at a "bargain price." Id. at 22, 59-60.
112. In the period 1924-35 the Inland Waternays Corporation, viewed as a continuing
Government enterprise, incurred a corporate deficit of q,945,907; viewed as a private
enterprise, a deficit of $14,727,466. On either basis the deficit has increased considerably
since 1935. Id. at 59.
